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Abstract: An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items
to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items
but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his
valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist.
We develop a dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core
allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment
of the items and its associated supporting price vector.
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1 Introduction
Auction theory typically assumes that all bidders can pay up to their values on the goods
for sale. However, in reality buyers often face budget or liquidity constraints and may
therefore be unable to afford what the goods are worth to them. Financial constraints
arise in a variety of situations, such as less developed countries, business downturns and
financial crises, see Che and Gale (1998) and Maskin (2000). Financial constraints can
pose a serious obstacle to the efficient allocation of the goods, thus resulting in the loss of
market efficiency. It is known that even when a single item is sold, it is generally impos-
sible to have a mechanism for achieving full market efficiency when bidders face budget
constraints, because budget constraints can fail the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
Moreover, auctions that do very well without budget constraints, if implemented under
budget constraints, often produce highly inefficient outcomes.
Although budget constraints make full market efficiency unattainable due to nonexis-
tence of Walrasian equilibrium, it is natural to ask whether there exists any mechanism
that can achieve the allocation of goods as efficient as possible. This paper aims to an-
swer this question in the affirmative. We examine a general model in which n (indivisible)
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items are sold to m budget constrained bidders. Each bidder wants to consume at most
one item. When bidders face no budget constraints, the model reduces to the well-known
assignment model as studied by Shapley and Shubik (1972), Crawford and Knoer (1981),
and Demange et al. (1986), among others. We propose a dynamic auction and prove that
the auction always finds a core allocation of the goods among bidders in finitely many
steps. The notion of core is more general than that of competitive equilibrium and is a
widely used solution concept for general exchange economies and NTU games, see Scarf
(1967).
In early literature, to cite but a few, Che and Gale (1998), Maskin (2000), Krishna
(2002), and Zheng (2001) have analysed various auctions for selling a single item when
bidders are financially constrained. Moreover, Benôıt and Krishna (2001), Brusco and
Lopomo (2008), and Pitchik (2009) have studied auctions for selling two items to budget
constrained bidders. Recently, van der Laan and Yang (2008) have examined a similar
model as the current one and developed an ascending auction that always finds a con-
strained equilibrium. The constrained equilibrium possesses several interesting properties
but does not necessarily yield a core allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes and analyzes the auction. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an auction model consisting of a seller (i.e., auctioneer) and m potentially bidders.
The seller has n indivisible goods for sale. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of the items,
and M = {1, 2, · · · ,m} the set of bidders. Let 0 denote the dummy good which has no
value and costs nothing for any agent. Every real item j ∈ N is inherently indivisible and
thus can be assigned to at most one bidder. The seller has for each real item j ∈ N a
reservation price c(j) ∈ Z+ below which the item will not be sold, where Z and Z+ are the
set of integers and the set of nonnegative integers, respectively. The reservation price of
the dummy good is known to be c(0) = 0. Every bidder i ∈ M demands at most one item
and has a (possibly negative) monetary valuation to each item in N ∪ {0} given by the
function V i: N ∪ {0} → Z with V i(0) = 0, and is endowed with a budget mi ∈ Z+ units
of money. All values V i(j), j 6= 0, and mi are private information and thus only bidder i
knows his own values V i(j), j 6= 0 and mi.
It is assumed that buying an item j ∈ N ∪{0} against price p(j) by bidder i yields him





V i(j) + mi − p(j) if p(j) ≤ mi,
−∞ if p(j) > mi.
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That is, bidders are not allowed to have a deficit of money. By this assumption, no bidder is
willing to pay a price for any item above his budget mi. We say that bidder i is financially
constrained if mi < maxj∈N V i(j), i.e., the valuation of bidder i for some items exceeds
what he can afford, and that bidder i faces no financial constraint otherwise. In this paper,
we allow mi < maxj∈N V i(j) for some i ∈ M . Observe that when no bidder faces any
financial constraint, this model becomes identical to the classical assignment market model
as studied by Shapley and Shubik (1972), Crawford and Knoer (1981), and Demange et
al. (1986) among others.
A price vector p ∈ IRn+1+ gives a price p(j) ≥ 0 for each item j ∈ N ∪ {0}. A price
vector p ∈ IRn+1+ is feasible if p(j) ≥ c(j) for every j ∈ N and p(0) = 0. The price of the
dummy good is always zero. Let N0 = N ∪ {0} denote the set of all items (including the
dummy) in the market. Let M0 = M ∪ {0} denote the set of all agents, where 0 stands
for the seller. An assignment is a vector π = (π(1), · · · , π(m)) of items among all bidders
in M such that π(i) = π(j) for i 6= j implies π(i) = 0. At an assignment π, every bidder
i ∈ M gets one item π(i) (which can be real or dummy). Notice that the dummy good
can be assigned to several bidders while every real item is assigned to at most one bidder.
With respect to π, let Nπ = {k ∈ N | k 6= π(i), ∀i ∈ M} denote the set of unsold items
which will be kept by the seller. Let A denote the family of all assignments.
At a feasible price vector p ∈ IRn+1+ , the demand set of bidder i ∈ M is given by
Di(p) = {j | V i(j)− p(j) = max{V i(k)− p(k) | p(k) ≤ mi, k ∈ N0}}.
Observe that for any feasible p, the demand set Di(p) 6= ∅, because p(0) = 0 ≤ mi and
thus the dummy item is always in the budget set. This means that the bidder has always
the possibility not to buy any real item.
A pair (p, π) of a feasible price vector p and an assignment π ∈ A is said to be imple-
mentable if p(π(i)) ≤ mi for all i ∈ M and p(j) = c(j) for all j ∈ Nπ, i.e., every bidder i
can afford to buy the item π(i) assigned to him, and the price of every unsold item equals
its reservation price. A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is an implementable pair (p∗, π∗) such
that π∗(i) ∈ Di(p∗) for all i ∈ M . It is well known from Shapley and Shubik (1972) that
when there is no financial constraint for any bidder, a Walrasian equilibrium always exists.
Moreover, Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Demange et al. (1986) have developed auction
mechanisms for finding Walrasian equilibria in such markets.
The following example shows that a Walrasian equilibrium may fail to exist if buyers
face financial constraints.
Example 1. A seller wants to sell item 1 to buyers 1 and 2. The seller’s reservation
price is zero, c(1) = 0. The two buyers’ valuations and budgets are V 1(1) = 4, V 2(1) = 6,
and m1 = m2 = 2.
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This market has no equilibrium, although both buyers have valuations and budgets
above the seller’s zero reservation price. To see this, we have to consider two cases for the
price of the item. At p(1) ≤ 2, the item is over-demanded, whereas at p(1) > 2 the item is
over-supplied.
Although a Walrasian equilibrium fails to exist, it is interesting to observe that imple-
mentable pairs (p, π1) = ((0, 2), (1, 0)) and (p, π2) = ((0, 2), (0, 1)) are core allocations and
Pareto efficient. To verify this, consider (p, π1) = ((0, 2), (1, 0)). At (p, π1), the seller gets
utility of p(1) = 2, buyer 1 utility of V (1) + m1 − p(1) = 4, and buyer 2 utility of m2 = 2.
This allocation is stable and thus in the core in the sense that the seller and buyer 2 cannot
block it because it is impossible for the seller to achieve a utility of more than 2. The same
argument applies to (p, π2).
The above example shows that when bidders face financial constraints, the Walrasian
equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist but the core may be still nonempty. It is well known
from Scarf (1965) that an exchange economy can have a nonempty core under fairly general
conditions. In the sequel, we shall prove the existence of a nonempty core for the auction
model with budget constrained bidders. We establish this result by proposing a dynamic
auction, which actually finds a core allocation in finitely many steps.
To introduce the notion of core, we first give several definitions. At an implementable
pair (p, π), the utilities that the bidders i ∈ M and the seller i = 0 can achieve are given
and denoted by









respectively. An implementable pair (p, π) is Pareto efficient if there does not exist another
implementable pair (p′, π′) such that U i(p′, π′) > U i(p, π) for all i ∈ M0. A nonempty
subset of M0 is called a coalition. Given a coalition S ⊆ M0, a feasible assignment ρS
is an assignment in A such that ρS(i) = 0 for every i ∈ M \ S. That is, at ρS, every
bidder in S receives at most one real item but every bidder outside S receives a dummy
item. A pair (q, ρS) of a feasible price vector q ∈ IRn+1+ and a feasible assignment ρS is
implementable if q(ρS(i)) ≤ mi for all i ∈ S and if q(j) = c(j) for every unsold item j ∈ NρS .
An implementable pair (p, π) is a core allocation if there does not exist any implementable
pair (q, ρS) with some coalition S such that U i(q, ρS) > U i(p, π) for all i ∈ S. Clearly, a core
allocation is Pareto efficient. Also a core allocation (p, π) ensures individual rationality,
that is, U i(p, π) ≥ mi for every bidder i ∈ M and U0(p, π) ≥ ∑h∈N c(h) for the seller.
Observe that when we consider any coalition of two or more agents, we only need to
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concentrate on those coalitions that contain both the seller and at least one bidder. Any
coalition consisting of only bidders can be excluded.
3 The dynamic auction
We now establish the existence of a core allocation for the auction model with budget
constrained bidders. This result can be seen as a generalization of the classic existence
theorem for the assignment markets without budget constraints to the more general case
which permits budget constraints. While in the classical model (see Shapley and Shubik
(1972)) the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations coincides with the strong core, in the
current model the core is shown to be non-empty but can be strictly larger than the set of
Walrasian equilibrium allocations.
Theorem 3.1 There exists at least one core allocation in the auction model with budget
constrained bidders.
We shall design a dynamic auction that can actually find in finitely many steps a core
allocation, thus yielding a constructive proof for this theorem. Briefly speaking, the auction
works as follows. Initially, every bidder submits a bid for every item that he is willing and
able to pay. Subsequently, taking all the current bids and her own reservation prices into
account the auctioneer chooses a profile of bids that can give her the highest revenue and
offers a spot market price for each item. Then each bidder updates his bid for every item
according to the spot market prices, his current bids and his budget and his valuations.
Again, the auctioneer updates. Repeat this process until no bidder is willing to offer any
new bid.
In each round t ∈ Z+ of the auction, every bidder i ∈ M offers a (feasible) bidding
function pit : N0 → Z with pit(0) = 0 and pit(k) ≤ min{mi, V i(k)} for every k ∈ N . That is,
no bidder is willing to bid above his budget or his value for any item. Let Pt = (p
1
t , · · · , pmt )
be the bidding system at round t. Since the auctioneer wishes to achieve the highest
revenue, her choice set at round t, is determined by















We can now give a detailed description of the dynamic auction.
The dynamic auction
Step 1: Every bidder i ∈ M offers a bidding function pi0. Set t = 0 and go to Step 2.
5
Step 2: Based on the current bidding system Pt, the auctioneer announces an as-
signment πt ∈ S(Pt) and a spot market price vector p̄t ∈ IRn+1 as follows. If
t = 0 or πt−1 6∈ S(Pt), take πt to be any element of S(Pt), and set p̄t(0) = 0,
p̄t(πt(i)) = p
i
t(πt(i)) when πt(i) ∈ N for some i ∈ M , and p̄t(k) = c(k) when k ∈ Nπt ,
and go to Step 3. If t > 0 and πt−1 ∈ S(Pt), then set πt = πt−1, p̄t(0) = 0, for any
πt(i) ∈ N for some i ∈ M , set p̄t(πt(i)) = p̄t−1(πt(i)) + 1 when, at round t− 1, some
bidder j increased his bid for the item πt(i) to p̄t−1(πt(i))+1, and set p̄t(k) = p̄t−1(k)
otherwise, and go to Step 3.
Step 3: Each bidder i ∈ M updates his bids by setting p̃it(k) = min{pit(k), p̄t(k)}
for all k ∈ N . For any bidder i ∈ M , if there exists some item k ∈ N such that
V i(k) − p̃it(k) > V i(πt(i)) − p̃it(πt(i)) and p̃it(k) < mi, bidder i updates his bidding
function by setting pit+1(k) = p̃
i





for any other item h ∈ N . Every other bidder i sets pit+1 = p̃it. When pit+1 6= p̃it for
some i ∈ M , then set t = t + 1 and go back to Step 2. Otherwise, the auction stops
and the output is (P̃t, πt).
This auction bears some similarity with pay-as-you-bid auctions used in internet or
more traditionally by governments for selling treasury bills, but it differs from them in
three crucial aspects: First, in Step 2, the auctioneer does not merely announce the spot
price for each item but more importantly she adjusts the spot price upwards when she
observes that some bidder increases his bid. Second, in Step 3, unlike the existing pay-
as-you-bid auctions in which bidders are not allowed to decrease their bids, the current
auction permits bidders to reduce their bids in order to avoid overbidding. Third, in Step
3, the current auction has a flexible rule for the bidders to adjust their bids for those
items which they can afford and give them higher profits, whereas the existing auctions
typically require the bidders to adjust their bids for those items which give the bidders
the highest profits. See Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for
pay-as-you-bid auctions in detail.
Observe that when the auction stops with (P̃t, πt), it is possible that some bidder i gets
item πt(i) which is not contained in his demand set D
i(p̃it). In this case, we must have
p̃it(k) = m
i for any k ∈ N satisfying V i(k)− p̃it(k) > V i(πt(i))− p̃it(πt(i)).
Proposition 3.2 In every round t of the auction, we have πt ∈ S(P̃t).




















































Similarly we can show the case of πt−1 ∈ S(Pt) in which πt = πt−1 ∈ S(P̃t). 2
The existing auctions are typically either ascending or decreasing. It is relatively easy
to prove their finite convergence because of obvious monotonicity. However, this is not the
case for the current auction, because in the current auction, the bidders may increase or
decrease their bids, this feature makes it impossible to use the familar argument. Instead,
we have to explore a new approach which makes use of the bids of all bidders and the
revenues of the seller.
Lemma 3.3 The auction terminates in finitely many rounds.





i(π(i)) denote the revenue of the seller at
(π, P ), and let R(P ) = max{R(π, P ) | π ∈ A} be the highest revenue at P . In each round t,
we have R(πt, Pt) = R(Pt). We need to consider two cases. In case of πt−1 6∈ S(Pt), we have
R(Pt) = R(πt, Pt) > R(πt−1, Pt), by the auction rule we have R(πt−1, Pt) ≥ R(πt−1, P̃t−1),
and from Proposition 3.2 it follows that R(πt−1, P̃t−1) = R(πt−1, Pt−1) = R(Pt−1). This
proves R(Pt) > R(Pt−1).
In case of πt−1 ∈ S(Pt), we have R(Pt) = R(Pt−1), because pit(πt(i)) = pit−1(πt−1(i)) for
all i ∈ M . In this case, at least one bidder increases his bid but no bidder decreases any
of his bids.
The two arguments imply that in each round, either the revenue of the seller is strictly
increasing, or the revenue of the seller remains constant and no bidder is bidding less but
at least one bidder is bidding more. Therefore, because of finite values and budgets, the
auction must stop in finitely many rounds. 2
Let π∗ = πt and p∗ = p̄t when the auction stops at round t. The following theorem
shows that the outcome (p∗, π∗) is a core allocation.
Theorem 3.4 The outcome (p∗, π∗) found by the auction is in the core and thus Pareto
efficient.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that (p∗, π∗) is not in the core. Clearly, the pair (p∗, π∗)
is individually rational. Then there exist a coalition S consisting of the seller and at least
one bidder and an implementable pair (q, ρS) such that U i(q, ρS) > U i(p∗, π∗) for all i ∈ S.























It is clear that there exists some j∗ ∈ N such that q(j∗) > p∗(j∗). This means that some
bidder i∗ ∈ S is assigned item j∗ at ρS, i.e., ρS(i∗) = j∗, because it holds min{p∗(j), q(j)} ≥
c(j) for all j ∈ N and q(j) = c(j) for every unassigned item j ∈ NρS . Observe that
since (q, ρS) is implementable and U i
∗
(q, ρS) > U i
∗
(p∗, π∗), we have V i
∗
(j∗) − q(j∗) >
V i
∗
(π∗(i∗))− p∗(π∗(i∗)) and q(j∗) ≤ mi∗ . It follows from q(j∗) > p∗(j∗) that
V i
∗







where t is the round when the auction stops. Because p̃it(k) ≤ p̄t(k) = p∗(k) for any i ∈ M
and k ∈ N , we have
V i
∗







∗) ≤ p̄t(j∗) = p∗(j∗) < q(j∗) ≤ mi∗ . But then at prices p̃i∗t , bidder i∗ should
have rejected the item π∗(i∗) and made a new offer, and therefore the auction could not
have stopped at round t. 2
4 Concluding remarks
In this article we have proposed a dynamic auction for finding a core allocation in a setting
where bidders are budget constrained and each bidder demands at most one item. It is
worth pointing out that the auctions developed by Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and
Stacchetti (2000), Milgrom (2000), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Perry and Reny (2005),
Ausubel (2004, 2006), Sun and Yang (2009) allow bidders to demand multiple items, albeit
in the absence of budget constraint. This more general but also more difficult case remains
to be explored when bidders face budget constraints.
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